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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS  
425 Eye Street N.W.  
ULLB, 3rd Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20536

File: EAC-00-267-54296

Office: Vermont Service Center

Date: MAY 29 2002

IN RE: Petitioner:  
Beneficiary:

Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,  
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is described as an import/export company trading in diamonds and precious gems. It seeks to extend its authorization to employ the beneficiary temporarily in the United States as its vice president. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary had been or would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.

On appeal, counsel argues that the director's decision was not consistent with previous decisions from the Administrative Appeals Office. Counsel concluded that the decision to deny the petition was "arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion."

To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L), the petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization and seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge.

8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form I-129 shall be accompanied by:

(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(1)(ii)(G) of this section.

(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed.

8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(14)(ii) states that a visa petition under section 101(a)(15)(L) which involved the opening of a new office may be extended by filing a new Form I-129, accompanied by the following:

(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(1)(ii)(G) of this section;

(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in paragraph (1)(1)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year;

(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition;

(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity; and

(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation.

The United States petitioner was incorporated in 1997 and states that it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of M/S Vee May Industries, located in India. The petitioner declares three employees but did not disclose its annual gross revenues. The initial petition was approved in order to open the new office. The petitioner seeks to extend the petition's validity and the beneficiary's stay for three years at an annual salary of \$31,200.

At issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity.

Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(44)(A), provides:

The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily-

i. manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization;

ii. supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization;

iii. if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the

organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and

iv. exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional.

Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(44)(B), provides:

The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily-

- i. directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization;
- ii. establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
- iii. exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
- iv. receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization.

In a letter submitted with the initial petition, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary "holds a position which is executive/managerial in its nature . . . by virtue of the fact that he primarily manages the overall day-to-day business activities of the company." In a follow-up letter dated January 11, 2001, the petitioner informed the Service that sixty percent of the beneficiary's time would be spent "performing essential function of marketing."

In his decision, the director concluded that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary was employed in a managerial or executive capacity.

On appeal, counsel argues that the director's decision was "arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion." Counsel asserts that the beneficiary's primary duties are qualifying pursuant to the Service decision in Matter of Irish Dairy Board.

On review, the record as presently constituted is not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The fact that an individual possesses an executive or managerial title and

operates a small business does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification in a managerial or executive capacity within the meaning of section 101(a)(44) of the Act. The Service must first look to the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties and the evidence submitted in support of the claimed duties.

The petitioner has stated that a preponderance of the beneficiary's duties have been and will be directly performing the operations of the organization, that is, marketing commodities on behalf of the foreign organization. An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). For this reason, the petition may not be approved.

Counsel refers on appeal to an unpublished appellate decision in a case involving an employee of the Irish Dairy Board. In that decision it was held that the beneficiary satisfied the requirements of acting primarily in a managerial capacity because his primary assignment was the management of a large organization using multiple subcontractors to carry out its functions, even though he was the sole direct employee of the petitioning organization. Counsel has furnished no evidence to establish that the facts of the instant petition are in any way analogous to those in the Irish Dairy Board case. Moreover, unpublished decisions are not binding in the administration of the Act. See 8 C.F.R. 103.3(c).

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.